Article, 2024

Being You — Or Not A Challenge for Garfield and Seth

Journal of Consciousness Studies, ISSN 1355-8250, Volume 31, 5-6, Pages 206-220, 10.53765/20512201.31.5.206

Contributors

Zahavi D. 0000-0002-2869-4951 (Corresponding author) [1]

Affiliations

  1. [1] University of Copenhagen
  2. [NORA names: KU University of Copenhagen; University; Denmark; Europe, EU; Nordic; OECD]

Abstract

In recent publications, Jay Garfield and Anil Seth have both written about the you. Whereas Garfield is a Buddhist scholar who advocates a no-self view, Seth is a neuroscientist who defends a radical form of representationalism. But is it really possible to speak meaningfully of a you (and of a we) if one denies the existence of the self, and if one declares the world of experience a neuronal fantasy? In the following, I will criticize both accounts. I will argue that they both, in different ways, are unable to deal with a real other, and, drawing on the work of Husserl, I will argue that a proper understanding of the you doesn’t merely require accepting the reality of the self, but also the existence of a shared lifeworld.

Funders

  • Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
  • European Research Council
  • Carlsbergfondet

Data Provider: Elsevier